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CaseNo.20070865-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEAL^ 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
William Thomas Domingue£, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
ST ATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for driving tinder the influence of 
alcohol, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (West 
Supp. 2005), and no proof of insurance, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-12a-303.2 (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
In issuing the telephonic search warrant, did the magistrate comply with the 
requirements of rule 40, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and if not, is 
suppression required? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. The trial court's legal conclusions "are 
reviewed non-deferentially for correctness/' State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 11,103 P.3d 
699, and its "underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error," State v. 
Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, % 11,100 P.3d 1222. Because the trial court's interpretation of 
rule 40, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is a question of law, it is reviewed for 
correctness. See Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, % 5,989 P.2d 1073. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The interpretation of rule 40, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is relevant to 
this appeal and the rule is reproduced in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, a third 
degree felony, together with driving with alcohol in his body with a no-alcohol 
license, driving on a revoked license, driving a vehicle without proof of insurance, 
and engaging in a speed contest or exhibition, all class B misdemeanors. R. 2-3. 
Following a preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound over for trial on all counts. 
R. 9-11. Defendant moved to suppress the blood alcohol evidence obtained 
pursuant to a telephonic search warrant. R. 17-18. After a hearing on the matter, the 
trial court denied the motion. R. 26-27, 29-30, 51. Defendant thereafter entered 
conditional guilty pleas to DUI and no proof of insurance, reserving his right to 
appeal the order denying his motion to suppress. R. 32-40. Defendant was 
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sentenced to concurrent prison sentences of zero-to-five years for DUI and 180 days 
for no proof of insurance. R. 40. Defendant timely appealed. R. 42-44. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Just after 1:00 a.m. on June 3,2007, Officer Chris Turley of the Utah Highway 
Patrol stopped Defendant for racing his Honda Civic against another car. R. 22-23. 
In speaking with Defendant, Officer Turley noticed that he "had red, bloodshot, 
glassy looking eyes" and "that his speech was noticeably slurred/' R. 23. After a 
records check revealed that Defendant's alcohol-restricted driver's license had been 
revoked, Officer Turley arrested Defendant. R. 23. As he did so, he "could smell a 
strong odor of an alcohol beverage coming from [Defendant's] breath in the open 
air." R. 23. Officer Turley requested that Defendant blow into a portable 
breathalyzer, but Defendant refused. R. 23. Defendant also refused to submit to 
field sobriety tests. R. 23. Officer Turley read the applicable "DUI admonitions," 
but Defendant "still would not cooperate and refused to give a chemical test." R. 23. 
After transporting Defendant to the police station, Officer Turley prepared a 
written affidavit in support of a search warrant authorizing a blood draw. R. 51:3. 
1
 The facts are taken from the Affidavit for Search Warrant, R. 22-23 
(Addendum B), and testimony at the suppression hearing, R. 51 (Addendum C). At 
the suppression hearing, Defendant did not challenge the circumstances leading to 
his initial detention and ensuing arrest. R. 51: 2. 
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Shortly after 2:00 a.m., Officer Turley telephoned Judge Brent West and informed 
him "of the subject's name, the reason for the stop, [and] all of the clues [he] 
observed . . . ." R. 51: 4-5. Before providing Judge West the probable cause 
information, Officer Turley was placed under oath. R. 51: 5. Although Officer 
Turley did not read every line of the written affidavit, he read the portion of the 
affidavit that set forth the facts supporting issuance of the warrant 
On June 3rd 2007, at approximately 0102 hours, I observed a red 
Honda Civic driving southbound on Washington Boulevard at 2400 
South in lane 1 racing a silver passenger car. The vehicle was stopped 
by the activation of my emergency lights. I approached the vehicle and 
William Dominguez [Defendant] was in the driver seat not wearing a 
seat belt. Dominguez had red, bloodshot, glassy looking eyes. As I 
spoke with Dominguez, I noticed that his speech was noticeably 
slurred. I conducted a records check on Dominguez using his name 
and date of birth. This information revealed that Dominguez had a 
[sic] alcohol revoked license and was an alcohol restricted driver. 
Dominguez denied consuming any alcohol. I placed Dominguez 
under arrest and could smell a strong odor of an alcohol beverage 
coming from his breath in the open air. 
I requested Dominguez blow into a portable breath tester, however he 
refused to blow. When asked if he would allow me to conduct field 
sobriety test, Dominguez said no and that he had been through this 
before. Dominguez refused to submit to any DUI field sobriety tests. I 
read Dominguez his DUI admonitions advising him of the 
consequences of not submitting to my tests. Dominguez still would 
not cooperate and refused to give a chemical test. 
Dominguez has at least 4 prior DUI convictions in the past 10 years and 
he is currently on parole for a felony DUI conviction. 
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R. 22-23; R. 51:4-5. At 2:27 a.m., and at the direction of Judge West, Officer Turley 
signed the warrant authorizing the blood draw. R. 24; R. 51: 5-6. A return on the 
search warrant was signed by Judge Ernest Jones the following day. R. 25; R. 51:6. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant contends that under rule 40, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the 
magistrate was required to record the telephonic warrant and probable cause 
statement. The rule, however, requires only that the warrant and probable cause 
statement be recorded, without specifying who is to do the recording. Officer 
Turley complied with this requirement by reducing the warrant and probable cause 
statement to writing. Defendant nevertheless contends that the magistrate was 
required to personally record the warrant and probable cause statement in order to 
comply with the retention requirements of rule 40. Such an interpretation, however, 
is not reasonable because it would discourage the use of telephonic warrants, at 
least until all magistrates are provided with the necessary equipment to record at 
home. 
Even assuming arguendo that the magistrate did not comply with the 
retention requirements, the evidence should not be suppressed. Defendant has 
shown no harm from the alleged technical violation. Moreover, because any 
retention violation is not constitutional in nature, suppression is not appropriate. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE BLOOD 
DRAW EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE 
TELEPHONIC SEARCH WARRANT SHOULD NOT BE 
SUPPRESSED 
Defendant claims that "the magistrate failed to retain, seal, or file any of the 
requisite documents or recordings/' as required under rule 40(i), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Aplt. Brf. at 7. Specifically, he complains that "[t]he magistrate 
did not record the [probable cause] conversation [with the applicant officer] by 
electronic or written means'' and thus "did not file any document" as required 
under the rule. Aplt. Brf. at 12. Defendant argues that the magistrate's failure to 
retain the search warrant documents constituted both a constitutional and statutory 
violation, requiring suppression of the evidence. See Aplt. Brf. at 6, 8-13. 
Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
A. The requirements of rule 40 were met when the officer applying 
for the telephonic search warrant reduced to writing both the 
search warrant and the probable cause statement. 
Under rule 40(Z) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a peace officer need 
not personally appear before a magistrate when applying for a search warrant, but 
may do so "remotely . . . by voice, image, text, or any combination of those, or by 
other means." Utah R.Crim. P. 40(f)(1). An officer may thus apply for a warrant via 
telephone, facsimile, e-mail, or other electronic means. In doing so, the officer must 
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be placed under "oath or affirmation/7 as with any warrant. See Utah R. Crim. P. 
40(Z)(2). If the facts communicated by the officer support a finding of probable 
cause, the magistrate may then "direct the . . . officer . . . to sign the magistrate's 
name on [the] warrant at [the] remote location/7 Utah R. Crim. P. 40(Z)(3)-(4). Such 
"remotely communicated search warrants77 are permissible under subsection (I) 
"when reasonable under the circumstances/7 Utah R. Crim. P. 40(Z)(1). 
Defendant has not claimed that use of the remotely communicated warrant 
was unreasonable under the circumstances of this case, nor has he challenged the 
sufficiency of the probable cause showing, or the officer's testimony that he read the 
probable cause statement verbatim to the magistrate. See Aplt. Brf. at 6-13; R. 51:10. 
He claims instead that the technical recording and retention requirements of rule 40 
were not satisfied. See Aplt. Brf. at 7-8,12. This claim fails. 
Subsection (I) of the rule does not impose upon the magistrate the duty of 
recording. It simply requires a recording, whether in writing or other means: 
(Z)(2) Communication to be recorded. All testimony upon which 
the magistrate relies for a finding of probable cause shall be on oath or 
affirmation. The testimony and content of the warrant shall be 
recorded. Recording shall be by writing or by mechanical, magnetic, 
electronic, photographic storage or by other means. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 40(Z)(2). Officer Turley fully satisfied this recording requirement 
when he included in the written affidavit the probable cause statement upon which 
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the magistrate relied in issuing the warrant—which statement was read verbatim to 
the magistrate. As in the case of traditional search warrants, this recording 
obligation reasonably falls to the search warrant applicant, not the magistrate. 
Defendant nevertheless argues that because subsection (i) requires the 
magistrate to retain the search warrant and supporting testimony at the time the 
warrant is issued, it implicitly charges the magistrate with recording. Aplt. Brf. at 7, 
12. Subsection (Z) requires compliance with subsection (i): 
(Z)(5) Filing of warrant and testimony. The warrant and recorded 
testimony shall be retained by and filed with the court pursuant to 
Section (i). Filing may be by writing or by mechanical, magnetic, 
electronic, photographic storage or by other means. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 40(Z)(5). Subsection (i) imposes various retention, sealing, and 
filing requirements upon the magistrate: 
(i) (1) At the time of issuance, the magistrate shall retain and seal 
a copy of the search warrant, the application and all affidavits or other 
recorded testimony on which the warrant is based and shall, within a 
reasonable time, file those sealed documents in court files which are 
secured against access by the public. Those documents shall remain 
sealed until twenty days following the issuance of the warrant unless 
the time is extended or reduced under Section (m). Unsealed search 
warrant documents shall be filed in the court record available to the 
public. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 40(i)(l). Defendant argues that unless the magistrate records the 
testimony himself, he cannot "retain" the search warrant and probable cause 
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testimony "[a]t the time of issuance/' as required under subsection (i). Aplt. Brf. at 
12. 
Where a remote warrant application is made by fax, email, or text, the 
magistrate automatically retains the remotely transmitted warrant and probable 
cause statement "[a]t the time of issuance." The capability jto retain the warrant and 
probable cause testimony is built into the electronic device used by the magistrate to 
receive the warrant information—in the printout produced by the magistrate's fax 
machine, in the magistrate's computer mailbox, or in the magistrate's inbox on his 
or her cellular telephone. In contrast, a magistrate's telephone is not necessarily 
equipped with similar retention capabilities. Rule 40 does not account for this 
deficiency, or otherwise provide the means to enable ipiagistrates to record a 
telephone conversation; yet it permits the telephonic warrant. 
Defendant's interpretation of the rule would have the effect of discouraging 
the use of telephonic warrants, rather than encouraging their use as intended tmder 
subsection (Z). If a magistrate does not have the equipment necessary to record a 
telephone conversation, he or she would be required to personally transcribe both 
the search warrant and the probable cause testimony. See Utah R. Crim. P. 40(i)(l). 
In cases like this, where application is made by a telephone call to a magistrate's 
home in the middle of the night, such a recording obligation on the magistrate will 
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often prove impracticable and unreliable. Those deficiencies will, in turn, have the 
effect of discouraging the use of telephonic warrants. Such a requirement does not 
"facilitate remote communications as a means for and issuing search warrants/' as 
intended by the rule. Utah R. Crim. P. 40, Advisory Committee Notes. Accordingly, 
in the case of telephonic search warrants, subsections (i) and (Z) should be 
interpreted as requiring retention as soon as practicable after issuance.2 
Defendant suggests that the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Anderson v. 
Taylor, 2006 UT 79,149 P.3d 352, supports a recording or retention requirement for 
telephonic warrants. See Aplt. Brf. at 7-8. However, the supreme court in Anderson 
did not address retention in the context of telephonic warrants and is thus 
inapposite. 
In Anderson, the petitioner challenged the practice of the Fourth District Court 
in routinely failing to retain copies of the search warrants it issued and the affidavits 
used to obtain those warrants. Anderson, 2006 UT 79, at % 1. Rather than retaining 
2
 Rule 40(Z) was also intended to "preserv[e] the integrity of the probable 
cause application and the terms of warrants that are authorized/' Utah R. Crim. P. 
40, Advisory Committee Notes. It does so by requiring retention by the magistrate 
of the email, fax, or text. The State acknowledges that it falls somewhat short in this 
regard in the context of a telephonic warrant. But as explained below, infra, at 12-14, 
the benefits of allowing a telephonic warrant outweigh the risks of later fabrication 
by officers. 
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these documents, the magistrate typically returned them to the officer seeking the 
warrant. Id. at f 2. These documents would be delivered back to the magistrate 
some time after the warrant was executed and a return submitted to the magistrate. 
Id. When Anderson was unable to obtain a copy of a warrant authorizing the search 
of his residence and the affidavit supporting that warrant, fre filed a petition for an 
extraordinary writ with the Utah Supreme Court. Id. at f f^ 3-4, 6.3 In his petition, 
Anderson argued that "the practice of issuing a warrant wiihout retaining copies of 
the warrant or the material supporting the request for th^ warrant violate[d] the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, article I, 
sections 7 and 14 of the Utah Constitution, and Utah Code sections 77-23-203 and 77-
23-204." Id. at \ 6. Anderson asked the court to "issue a declaratory judgment 
enjoining this practice and declaring it to be a violation of his constitutional rights." 
Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court concluded that the statute implicitly required 
retention of the warrant documents. Id. at |1f 16-18.4 Exercising its inherent 
supervisory authority, the court also "require[d] that magistrates issuing search 
The district court located the warrant and supporting documents ten days 
after the petition for an extraordinary writ was filed. Anderson, 2006 UT 79, at 1 7. 
4
 Having thus concluded, the court did not reach Anderson's constitutional 
claims. Id. at 1f 16. 
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warrants retain in their custody copies of all search warrants issued, as well as the 
material supporting search warrant applications, rather than surrendering to law 
enforcement the only copies of such material." Id. at f 22 (emphases added). 
Unlike the facts discussed in Anderson, in the case of a telephonic warrant and 
its supporting probable cause statement, the magistrate never has custody or 
possession of these documents and thus cannot "retain" them. One cannot retain 
that which he or she has never had. See Merriam-Webster Online, located at 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/retain (defining "retain" as "to 
keep in possession or use"). Nor can one surrender something never possessed. 
Anderson does not, therefore, apply to telephonic warrants. 
The State acknowledges that telephonic warrants, not in the custody of the 
magistrate, present the same concerns identified in Anderson. The officer executing 
the telephonic warrant maintains custody of the warrant and recorded probable 
cause statement until some time after issuance of the warrant. See id. at % 22. 
Accordingly, the magistrate is left without a record for a period of time, creating 
"the possibility that affidavits and other court records may be mishandled or even 
altered without detection." Id. Where the warrant and supporting affidavit are 
initially provided to the magistrate, it is a simple and prudent requirement that 
magistrates retain copies of these documents. But in the case of telephonic warrants, 
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the risks of fabrication must be weighed against the advantages of proceeding 
without a warrant under, for example, the exigent circumstances exception. The 
benefit of securing prior judicial authorization outweighs those risks. 
The risk that officers will alter an affidavit supporting a telephonic warrant 
seems remote, at best. An officer has little incentive to alt$r an affidavit after-the-
fact, where he runs the real risk of being detected by the magistrate who issued the 
warrant. Moreover, an officer predisposed to falsifying prdbable cause information 
may just as easily, and perhaps more safely, include fabricated facts at the outset, 
rather than after-the-fact. Against this remote risk of fabrication is the benefit 
derived from seeking prior judicial approval through a telephonic warrant. As 
recently observed by the Utah Supreme Court, "[t]he legislative intent behind the 
telephonic warrant procedure is to encourage use of warrants and minimize resort to 
warrantless searches when circumstances might otherwise be exigent." State v. 
Rodriguez, 2007 UT15, Tf 36,156 P.3d 771 (quotation and citation omitted) (emphasis 
added). Until magistrates are provided with the equipment necessary to record 
telephone conversations at home or on the road, the recording of telephonic 
affidavits and warrants by the magistrate will be impracticable. And in that case, 
officers will likely be forced to proceed under the exigent circumstances exception. 
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Given the remote risk of fabrication, it is better to proceed under the authorization 
of a telephonic warrant rather than under the exigent circumstances exception. 
B. Even assuming arguendo the magistrate did not comply with the 
technical retention requirements of rule 40, that error was 
harmless and does not require suppression. 
Even assuming arguendo that the magistrate below should have recorded the 
warrant and sworn statement—thereby enabling him to retain them at the time the 
warrant was issued—his failure to do so does not require suppression. Defendant 
argues that the recording and retention requirements "are statutory, and the failing 
to follow the statute violated [his] due process constitutional rights." Aplt. Brf. at 
12-13. This argument lacks merit. Defendant has cited to no authority in support of 
the proposition that official conduct violating a statute or rule, without more, 
requires suppression under due process. See Aplt. Brf. at 12-13. There is none. Cf. 
State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1988) (holding that technical violation of 
knock-and-announce statute did not require suppression). 
Rule 40 does not specify a remedy for violations specific to that rule. 
Accordingly, violations of the rule are subject to rule 30 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. See State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1261-62 (Utah 1983) 
(holding that "the Court is obliged to disregard the 'defect' in the [search warrant] 
affidavit by reason of the content of Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure"). 
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Under rule 30, an "error, defect, irregularity or variance . . . shall be disregarded" 
unless it "affect[s] the substantial rights of a party." Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). As a 
general rule, this requires the defendant to show that "th^ error is substantial and 
prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there 
would have been a more favorable result for the defendant." State v. Johnson, 771 
P.2d 1071,1073 (Utah 1989).5 Defendant has not made th^t showing. 
Defendant has not challenged Officer Turley's testimony that after being 
placed under oath, he read verbatim to the magistrate the portion of the affidavit 
which formed the basis of the probable cause finding. See Aplt. Brf. at 6-13; R. 51: 
10. Nor has he challenged the sufficiency of that probable cause statement. See 
Aplt. Brf. at 6-13. Defendant, therefore, has not demonstrated that the magistrate's 
alleged failure to comply with the recording and retention requirements of rule 40 
"had any adverse affect upon his substantial rights, nor ha[s] [he] shown that such 
failure in any way compromised the integrity of the documents." Anderton, 668 P.2d 
at 1262. Thus, as in Anderton, which involved the failure of Jhe magistrate to comply 
with statutory requirements regarding the return of the search warrant to the trial 
5
 If the error "results in the deprivation of a constitutional right," it will be 
disregarded only if it was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Calliham, 
2002 UT 86, f 45,55 P.3d 573. As explained below, Defendant has not established 
the deprivation of a constitutional right. 
15 
court, the alleged rule violation here "constituted nothing more than the failure to 
perform a ministerial act which did not affect the validity of the search warrant and 
the search conducted thereunder." Id. 
Defendant suggests that suppression of the evidence is required under the 
Fourth Amendment. Aplt. Brf. at 11-12 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471,485 (1963), and State v. Deherrera, 965 P.2d 501,505 (Utah App. 1998)). He fails, 
however, to demonstrate a Fourth Amendment violation. A violation of rule 40's 
recording or retention requirements does not constitute a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. As explained by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, "[t]he Fourth 
Amendment does not require that the basis for probable cause be established in a 
written affidavit; it merely requires that the information provided the issuing 
magistrate be supported by "Oath or affirmation/" United States v. Clyburn, 24 F.3d 
613, 617 (4th Or.) (quoting U.S Const, amend. IV), cert, denied, 513 U.S 907 (1994). 
Likewise, "the Amendment does not 'require that statements made under oath in 
support of probable cause be tape-recorded or otherwise placed on the record or 
made part of the affidavit/" Id. (quoting United States v. Shields, 978 F.2d 943,946 
(6th Cir. 1992)). Because there was no Fourth Amendment violation, Defendant's 
16 
reliance on the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary remedy is misplaced. 
Suppression is not warranted.6 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted Mayj£L 2008. 
MARKL.SHURTL^FF 
Utah Attorney General 
S.GRAY 
/Assistant Attorney Gene 
Counsel for Appellee 
6
 Defendant further contends that the evidence obtained pursuant to the 
search warrant should be suppressed because other "[m]inor failings" in the law 
"can [also] result in significant and permanent ramifications." Aplt. Brf. at 10-11. 
This argument, however, is more appropriately addressed to the Legislature or rules 
committee, not the Court. See State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359,362 (Utah 1995) (noting 
that policy discussions are "better accomplished in the legislature than in the 
courts"). 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Addendum A 
RULE 40. SEARCH WARRANTS 
(a) Definitions. 
As used in this rale: 
(a)(1) "Daytime" means the hours beginning at 6 a.m+ and ending at 10 p.m. 
local time. 
(a)(2) "Recorded" or "recording" includes the original recording of testimony, 
a return or other communication or any copy, printout, facsimile, or other 
replication that is intended by the person making the recording to have the same 
effect as the original. 
(a)(3) "Search warrant" is an order issued by a magistrate in the name of the 
state and directed to a peace officer, describing with particularity the thing, place, 
or person to be searched and the property or evidence to b$ seized and includes an 
original written or recorded warrant or any copy, printout, facsimile or other 
replica intended by the magistrate issuing the warrant to |iave the same effect as 
the original. 
(b) Grounds for issuance. 
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant to a search warrant if there is 
probable cause to believe it: 
(b)(1) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
(b)(2) has been used or is possessed for the purpose of toeing used to commit or 
conceal the commission of an offense; or 
(b)(3) is evidence of illegal conduct. 
(c) Conditions precedent to issuance. 
(c)(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and shall particularly describe the person or place to be 
searched and the person, property, or evidence to be seized. 
(c)(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal conduct, and is in 
the possession of a person or entity for which there is insufficient probable cause 
shown to the magistrate to believe that such person or entity is a party to the 
alleged illegal conduct, no search warrant shall issue except upon a finding by the 
magistrate that the evidence sought to be seized cannot be obtained by subpoena, 
or that such evidence would be concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered if 
sought by subpoena. If such a finding is made and a search warrant issued, the 
magistrate shall direct upon the warrant such conditions that reasonably afford 
protection of the following interests of the person or entity in possession of such 
evidence: 
(c)(2)(A) protection against unreasonable interference with normal business; 
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(c)(2)(B) protection against the loss or disclosure of protected confidential 
sources of information; or 
(c)(2)(C) protection against prior or direct restraints on constitutionally 
protected rights. 
(d) Search warrant served in readable form. 
A copy of a search warrant shall be served in a readable form upon the person 
or place to be searched. 
(e) Time for service—Officer may request assistance. 
(e)(1) The magistrate shall insert a direction in the warrant that it be served in 
the daytime, unless the affidavit or recorded testimony states sufficient grounds to 
believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to its being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good reason; in which case 
the magistrate may insert a direction that it be served any time of the day or night. 
(e)(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten days from the date of 
issuance. Any search warrant not executed within this time shall be void and shall 
be returned to the court or magistrate as not executed. 
(e)(3) An officer may request other persons to assist in conducting the search. 
(f) Receipt for property taken. 
The officer, when seizing property pursuant to a search warrant, shall give a 
receipt to the person from whom it was seized or in whose possession it was 
found. If no person is present, the officer shall leave the receipt in the place where 
the property was found. 
(g) Return—Inventory of property taken. 
The officer, after execution of the warrant, shall promptly make a signed return 
of the warrant to a magistrate of the issuing court and deliver a written or recorded 
inventory of anything seized, stating the place where it is being held. 
(h) Safekeeping of property. 
The officer seizing the property shall be responsible for its safekeeping and 
maintenance until the court otherwise orders. 
(i) Magistrate to retain and file copies—Documents sealed for twenty days-
Forwarding of record to court with jurisdiction. 
(i)(l) At the time of issuance, the magistrate shall retain and seal a copy of the 
search warrant, the application and all affidavits or other recorded testimony on 
which the warrant is based and shall, within a reasonable time, file those sealed 
documents in court files which are secured against access by the public. Those 
documents shall remain sealed until twenty days following the issuance of the 
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warrant unless that time is extended or reduced underi Section (m). Unsealed 
search warrant documents shall be filed in the court recordl available to the public. 
(i)(2) Sealing and retention of the file may be accomplished by: 
(i)(2)(A) placing paper documents or storage media in a sealed envelope and 
filing the sealed envelope in a court file not available to thp public; 
(i)(2)(B) storing the documents by electronic or other ftieans under the control 
of the court in a manner reasonably designed to preserve the integrity of the 
documents and protect them against disclosure to the public during the period in 
which they are sealed; or 
(i)(2)(C) filing through the use of an electronic filing system operated by the 
State of Utah which system is designed to transmit Accurate copies of the 
documents to the court file without allowing alteration to the documents after 
issuance of the warrant by the magistrate. 
(j) Findings required for service without notice. 
If the magistrate finds upon proof, under oath, that the object of the search may 
be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm may result to 
any person if notice were given, the magistrate may direct that the officer need not 
give notice of authority and purpose before entering the premises to be searched. 
(k) Violation of health, safety, building, or animal cruelty laws or ordinances-
Warrant to obtain evidence. 
In addition to other warrants provided by this rule, a magistrate, upon a 
showing of probable cause to believe a state, county, or citv law or ordinance, has 
been violated in relation to health, safety, building, or animal cruelty, may issue a 
warrant for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a violation. A warrant may be 
obtained from a magistrate upon request of a peace officer or state, county, or 
municipal health, fire, building, or animal control official only after approval by a 
prosecuting attorney. A search warrant issued under this section shall be directed 
to any peace officer within the county where the warrant jis to be executed, who 
shall serve the warrant. Other concerned personnel may accompany the officer. 
(I) Remotely communicated search warrants. 
(/)(1) Means of communication. When reasonable unddr the circumstances, a 
search warrant may be issued upon sworn or affirmed testimony of a person who 
is not in the physical presence of the magistrate, provided the magistrate is 
satisfied that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant. All 
communication between the magistrate and the peace officer or prosecuting 
attorney requesting the warrant may be remotely transmitted by voice, image, text, 
or any combination of those, or by other means. 
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(/)(2) Communication to be recorded. All testimony upon which the magistrate 
relies for a finding of probable cause shall be on oath or affirmation. The 
testimony and content of the warrant shall be recorded. Recording shall be by 
writing or by mechanical, magnetic, electronic, photographic storage or by other 
means. 
(0(3) Issuance. If the magistrate finds that probable cause is shown, the 
magistrate shall issue a search warrant. 
(0(4) Signing warrant. Upon approval, the magistrate may direct the peace 
officer or the prosecuting attorney requesting a warrant from a remote location to 
sign the magistrate's name on a warrant at a remote location. 
(0(5) Filing of warrant and testimony. The warrant and recorded testimony 
shall be retained by and filed with the court pursuant to Section (i). Filing may be 
by writing or by mechanical, magnetic, electronic, photographic storage or by 
other means. 
(0(6) Usable copies made available. Except as provided in Sections (i) and (m) 
of this rule, any person having standing may request and shall be provided with a 
copy of the warrant and a copy of the recorded testimony submitted in support of 
the application for the warrant. The copies shall be provided in a reasonably usable 
form. 
(m) Sealing and Unsealing of Search Warrant Documents. 
(m)(l) Application for sealing of documents related to search warrants. A 
prosecutor or peace officer may make a written or otherwise recorded application 
to the court to have documents or records related to search warrants sealed for a 
time in addition to the sealing required by Subsection (i)(l). Upon a showing of 
good cause, the court may order the following documents to be sealed: 
(m)(l)(A) applications for search warrants; 
(m)(l)(B) search warrants; 
(m)(l)(C) affidavits or other recorded testimony upon which the search warrant 
is based; 
(m)(l)(D) the application, affidavits or other recorded testimony and order for 
sealing the documents. 
(m)(2) Sealing of search warrant documents. Search warrant documents are 
public record that may be sealed in entirety or in part and not placed in the public 
file if all or part of the information in them would: 
(m)(2)(A) cause a substantial risk of harm to a person's safety; 
(m)(2)(B) pose a clearly unwarranted invasion of or harm to a person's 
reputation or privacy; or 
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(m)(2)(C) pose a serious impediment to the investigation. 
Sealed documents shall be maintained in a file not av4ilable to the public. If a 
document is not sealed in its entirety, the court may order a copy of the document 
with the sealed portions redacted to be placed in the public} file and an un-redacted 
copy to be placed in the sealed file. Except as required by Section (i), no document 
may be designated as "Filed under Seal" or "Confidential" unless it is 
accompanied by a court order sealing the document. 
(m)(3) Unsealing of documents. Any person having standing may file a motion 
to unseal search warrant documents with notice to the prosecutor and law 
enforcement agency. If the prosecutor or law enforcement agency files an 
appropriate and timely objection to the unsealing, the courj: may hold a hearing on 
the motion and objection. Where no objection to unsealing the documents is filed, 
the defendant may prepare an order for entry by the court. The court may order the 
unsealing of the documents or order copies of the documqnts to be delivered to a 
designated person without unsealing the documents a^ id require the person 
receiving the documents not to disclose the contents to ai}y other person without 
the authorization of the court. 
(m)(4) Length of time documents may remain sealed. The documents may 
remain sealed until the court finds, for good cause, that I the records should be 
unsealed. 
[Approved effective May 2, 2005; amended effective April 30, 2007.] 
Advisory Committee Notes 
(a) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-201 Utah Codel Ann. 
(b) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-202 Utah Code Ann. 
(c) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-203 Utah Code Ann. 
(d) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-204 Utah Codel Ann. 
(e) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-205 Utah Code Ann. 
(f) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-206 Utah Code Ann. The statute 
contained the words "Failure to give or leave a receipt does not render pe evidence seized 
inadmissible at trial." This rule is not a departure from that original legislative intent. While the 
committee did not consider it necessary to address admissibility in a procedural rule, the 
elimination of that language does not suggest that failure to comply with the receipt requirement 
should be a basis for exclusion of the evidence seized. 
(g) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-207 Utah Code Ann. 
(h) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-208 Utah Code Ann. 
(i) Subsection (1) is added in compliance with the order of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79. Subsection (2) is added to allow for ^ planned electronic search 
warrant system operated by the Utah Bureau Of Criminal Identification, or other systems which 
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might be employed by a magistrate. This provision supercedes the supervisory orders of the Court 
in Anderson v. Taylor for that purpose. 
(j) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-210(2) Utah Code Ann. 
(k) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-211 Utah Code Ann. 
(1) This section was formerly Rule 40 Remotely Communicated Search Warrants. Terms used 
are intended to be interpreted liberally in order to facilitate remote communications as a means of 
applying for and issuing search warrants while at the same time preserving the integrity of the 
probable cause application and the terms of warrants that are authorized. 
(m) (New section) 
Cross References 
Remotely communicated search warrant issued under this rule, see § 77-23-204. 
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ADDENDUM B 
Addendum B 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AMWiAVll FUU SEARCH WARRANT 
The undersigned being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That the Affiant has reason to believe that William Thomas Domingue* possessed 
and/or used drags and /or alcohol 
On the person(s) of: William Dominguez 
In the City of Ogden, County of Weber, State of Utah, theri is now certain property or 
evidence described as: 
Blood belonging to William Thomas Dominguez, Your Affiant believes William Thomas Donringuez's 
blood contains evidence of driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs in violation of Utah Code 
Ana. section 41-6a-502, 
Your Affiant believes die blood contains the Mowing substance: 
• Drugs 
• and/or Alcohol 
Thai said property or evidence: 
Is evidence of illegal conduct. 
AFFIANT STATEMENT: 
Affiant is Trooper Chris Turiey, a Police Officer with the Utah Highway Pattol, and bang duly sworn, 
deposes and states that 
Affiant has been a Peajce Officer for nearly two years currently serving as a State Trooper with the Utah 
Highway Patrol, I have been trained in detecting and arresting alcohol and drug impaired drivers. I have 
received training in Standard Field Sobriety Tests and is curiwtly certified to operate the Intoxilyzer. I 
regularly come in contact with people who are under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs while out on 
patrol. Currently I have arrested approximately 50 DUTs, 
The facts establishing the grounds for issuance of a search warrant are: 
OnJuneS 2007, at approximately 0102 hours, I observed a red Honda Civic driving gnuthhnmirl rm Wa^rfgfrm 
Boulevard at 2400 Sooth in lane 1 racing a silver passenger car. The vehicle was stopped by the activation of 
1-
my emergency lights. I approached the vehicle and William Dominguez was in the driver seat not wearing a seat 
belt Dominguez bad red, bloodshot, glassy looking eyes. As I spoke with Dominguez, I noticed that his speech 
was noticeably slurred. I conducted a records check on Dominguez using his name and date of birth. This 
information revealed that Dominguez had a alcohol revoked license and was an alcohol restricted driver. 
Dominguez denied consuming any alcohol I placed Dominguez under arrest and could smell a strong odor of 
an alcohol beverage coming from his breath in die open air. 
I requested Dominguez blow into a portable breath tester, however he refused to blow. When asked ifhe would 
aUow me to cemduct field sobriety t ^ f r Dominguez 
refused to submit to any Dm field sobriety tests. I read Dominguez his DUI admonitions advising him of die 
consequences of not submittingtomy tests. Dominguez still would not cooperate and refused to give a chemical 
Dominguez has at least 4 prior DUI convictions in the past 10 years and he is currently on parole for a felony 
DUI conviction. 
WHEREFORE, the Affiant prays that the search warrant be issued for the sei2antofsaid items at anytime day 
or night due to the following reasons: 
It is currently nighttime, and there is a need to 9orvt the warrant before daylight to secure important 
evidence in this case prior to it dissipating from his/her system. 
• It is currently night time, and the suspect is cazrraifly in cmstocfy awaiting author^ 
obtain his/her blood 
It is further requested that the officer executing die warrant use a reasonable amount of force to obtain the 
e. 
William Dominguez has refused to submit to a chemical test He may resist having his blood drawn, 
therefore, it may be necessary to restrain him while die blood is being drawn. 
S^ONn^ftSTRICt COURTJUDGE 
ftO&*f 
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me, Judge Brent West, I am satisfied that 
there is probable cause to believe that: 
On the person(s) oft 
In the Chy of Ogdea, County of Weber, State of Utah, there h now certain property or evidence described 
as: 
Blood belonging to William Thomas Dominguez born 5-20-82 
That contains the following substance: 
• Alcohol and/or Drugs 
That said property or evidence: 
Is evidence of illegal conduct 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED 
At anytime, day or night 
To make a search of die above named or described persons) fin-die herein above described property or 
evidence, and ifyou find the same, or any part 
District Court, Weber County, State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody subject to the order of 
this court This court authorizes the officer to arrange for the retentjem of this evidence, 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME 
K, ' «%&&dm ii&ikicf ouugr JUDOS 
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT W*"i*+ 0oM;Mg§4 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RETURN OF SEARCH WARRANT 
NO: 
Tie evidence listed below was taken from the person of William Thomas Dominguez 
1. Blood which is believed to contain alcohol above the legal limit of .08 and/or drugs to 
render him incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle. 
By virtue ofa search warrant, dated the 3rd day of June, 2007, and issued by Judge Brent 
West of the above-entitled court 
I, Trooper Chris Turley whom this warrant was executed by, do swear that the blood 
listed above, was taken at my direction, under authority of the warrant issued by Judge 
Btent West, on June 3rf, 2007 
The evidence that was taken by virtue of said warrant will be retained in my custody, and 
sent to the lab for analysis, and will be subj cot to the order of this court, or any other 
court, which may have jurisdiction over this evidence. 
AFFIANT. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, this S ' day of June, 2007. 
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THE COURT: Okay. This is State of Utah versus 
William Dominguez, 071901654. Go ahead, Mr. Shaw. 
MR. SHAW: We call Trooper Turley to the stand. 
CHRIS TURLEY, 
being first duly sworn, was examined 
and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SHAW: 
Q. Trooper, please state your full name and occupation. 
A. Chris Turley. I'm a state trooper with the Utah 
Highway Patrol. 
Q. And how long have you been so employed? 
A. Umm, a little over two years now. 
Q. Did you have occasion to come into contact with the 
defendant, William Thomas Dominguez, on June 3rd of 2007? 
MR. GRAVIS: We111 stipulate to that, Your Honor. 
We'll stipulate that he arrested him for a DUI. 
MR. SHAW: Okay. 
MR. GRAVIS: I don't think we need to go through all 
that. 
MR. SHAW: Okay. We'll get right to the issue of 
the search warrant. There came a time during the course of 
the arrest where Mr. Dominguez refused to take an intoxylizer 
test, or other chemical test; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
2 
Q. And what did you do in response to that? 
A. At that time I wrote a search warrant, I contacted 
Judge West by telephone. 
Q. And when you say you wrote a search warrant, did you 
write the warrant prior to contacting -- an affidavit for the 
warrant prior to contacting Judge West? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And where did you do that? 
A. At my office. 
Q. Okay. The defendant, then, was still with you and 
present at the time you were preparing the warrant, or 
affidavit for warrant? 
A. Yes. He was under supervision at the office. 
MR. SHAW: Your Honor, we have — I suppose there's 
a stipulation that the affidavit is accurate as reflected in 
the memorandum? 
MR. GRAVIS: I stipulate that that's the affidavit 
the officer prepared, but not that that's what was told to 
Judge West. 
MR. SHAW: Okay. That's fin£. 
Q. (BY MR. SHAW) So you prepared an affidavit and you 
contacted Judge West telephonically? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Tell us about the telephone conversation. What did 
you inform Judge West of during the telephone conversation? 
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A. I informed him of the subject's name, the reason for 
the stop, all of the clues I observed as far as his red blood 
shot eyes, the smell of the odor of alcohol, the subjectfs 
unwillingness to submit to a chemical test. 
Q. Do you have a copy of the affidavit for search 
warrant? 
A. I do. 
Q. Look at that with me, if you will. Let's just go 
through it if we night for a moment line item by line item. 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, we'll submit that the 
affidavit can be entered so we don't have to go through all 
of it. If the state wants to submit the affidavit, it speaks 
for itself. 
MR. SHAW: Okay. 
MR. GRAVIS: At least the alleged affidavit, let's 
make it that way. 
MR. SHAW: Okay. That's fine. 
Q. (BY MR. SHAW) What I'm getting at, trooper, is did 
you in fact read part or all of this affidavit to Judge West 
while you had him on the telephone? 
A. Umm, I did not read him every line of this affidavit. 
I stated the facts to him. I did state all of the facts that 
are in this affidavit as far as the reason for the stop, the 
reason for wanting to obtain a warrant. 
Q. Are you able, looking at the affidavit, to tell us 
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what, if any, part of the affidavit was read specifically to 
the judge on the telephone? 
A, Umm, I read him the reason for the stop, which is on 
the first page at the bottom. 
Q. Starting with on June 3rd, 2007^ at approximately 
1:02 hours? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Continuing all the way through jwhere I requested 
Dominguez's blood to a portable blood tester and he refused. 
I also informed him that Dominguez had at least four prior 
DUI convictions in the past ten years. And that he was on 
parole for a felony DUI conviction. 
Q. Okay. And then, prior to you reading that portion of 
the affidavit or going through that information with Judge 
west, were you placed under oath by Judge West? 
A. I was. 
Q. Okay. And at the conclusion of the affidavit, or at 
least your statement to the judge, whi|ch included part of the 
affidavit, what did Judge West direct you to do? 
A. Umm, he advised me to affix a signature to the 
affidavit. 
Q. And was that done in accordance with the judge's 
order at 0227 hours? 
A. It was. 
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Q. Okay. And then did you sign the affidavit p 
Judge West directing you to sign his name? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
sign it 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I did not. 
When did you sign the affidavit? 
When he told me to. 
Okay. That's what I'm saying, when he 
you went ahead and signed the affidavit 
That's correct. 
In its current form? 
Correct. 
And then looking at the search warrant, 
affix Judge West's name to that search warrant 
A. 
Q. 
warrant 
subsequ< 
Jones? 
A. 
Q. 
I did. 
told 
/> 
did 
rior to 
you 
you 
to 
also I 
at 0227 hours? 
Okay. And then ultimately there is a return 
wherein you returned the warrant. And 
on 
it was 
sntly signed, it looks like, June 4th, 2007, 
That's correct. 
Was there any other attempt to make a record 
telephone conference between yourself and Judge West 
J this entire process? 
A. No. 
MS. HUGIE: Okay. That's all. 
MR. GRAVIS: I have no questions. 
THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you. 
the 
by Judge J 
of the 
during 
Any 
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further witnesses? 
MR. SHAW: No, that's all the witnesses we have. 
THE COURT: Go ahead if you want to argue it. 
MR. SHAW: Your Honor, I think the argument that we 
made is straightforward in the memorandum. Rule 40(1) has 
somewhat modified the previous statute as I read it and 
defines recording to include a written record of the 
conversation. Trooper Turley has a written record that was 
prepared simultaneously with his conversation with Judge 
West. He's testified that he under oath stated those facts 
contained in that affidavit to Judge West. Judge West 
directed him, upon the conclusion of that, to sign his name 
to the warrant. That warrant was then issued. 
I want to be specific about this, because I think rule 
40(a)(2) defines recorded or recording as including the 
"recording of testimony, a return or other communication or 
any copy, printout, facsimile, or other replication that is 
intended by the person making the recording to have the same 
effect as the original." It's a written document. Trooper 
Turley followed that document during his conversation. 
Then, if you look at rule 40(1) (2), the recording of 
testimony is sufficient if in written form. That's what the 
affidavit is. It was substantially complied with in 
accordance with rule 40 and we think it's a valid warrant. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Go ahead. 
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MR. GRAVIS: Well, Your Honor, I agree that rule 40 
has replaced the statute, but the state is skipping over rule 
i(l), which says that — 
THE COURT: Let me get it out. Hold on a second. 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
THE COURT: And you were looking at what? 
MR. GRAVIS: 40 (i) (1) . 
THE COURT: You know, I guess I have my 2007 book in 
my office. I thought I had one out here, but I don't seem 
to. Why don't you read it to me. 
MR. GRAVIS: "At the time of issuance, the 
magistrate shall retain and seal a copy of the search 
warrant, the application and all affidavits or other recorded 
testimony on which the warrant is based, and shall, within a 
reasonable time, file those sealed documents in court files 
which are secured against access by the public. Those 
documents shall remain sealed until 20 days following the 
issuance of the warrant unless that time is extended or 
reduced under section M. Unsealed search warrant documents 
shall be filed in the court record available to the public." 
So I submit that rule (i)(1) requires that that record be 
prepared by the magistrate, not by the officer. There's no 
evidence that any recording of the testimony of the officer 
was made by the magistrate. When we tried to obtain a copy 
there was nothing there. There was no signed copy of the 
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search warrant, therefs no signed — 
THE COURT: There's nothing on file here? 
MR. GRAVIS: Nothing on file other than what the 
state has already filed, which is the warrant signed by the 
officer with Judge West's signature and the affidavit that he 
prepared with the officer — 
THE COURT: So what's your primary complaint about 
this exactly? 
MR. GRAVIS: There's no affidavit. There's no facts 
which the magistrate can base a search warrant on because 
there's no record of that conversation between the officer 
and Judge West that is required to be made by the magistrate, 
not by the officer. 
THE COURT: What's required to be made? 
MR. GRAVIS: The record. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's say he came in and brought 
a copy of the affidavit in on Monday, or the next morning, 
whatever the next business days was, d<±> you think that's 
sufficient? 
MR. GRAVIS: No. It says at the time of issuance. 
It clearly says at the time of issuanck the magistrate shall. 
Not may, shall. So the magistrate has to do that at the time 
of the issuance of the telephonic warrant or any other 
warrant, he's got to make a signed copy and a copy of the 
affidavit. If there's no affidavit it says or other recorded 
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testimony. But it's at the time of the issuance of the 
warrant. 
THE COURT: I guess I'm wondering, is it your 
complaint that he didn't read verbatim the affidavit? 
MR. GRAVIS: No. My point is — 
THE COURT: I'm just trying to understand exactly 
what you're complaining about. 
MR. GRAVIS: Our complaint is that there's no 
evidence to base the search warrant on. The recording which 
is required under the statute has to be made by the 
magistrate and it's not done here. So we have — we don't 
know what he told the magistrate because, I submit, the work 
product is not good enough. The law requires that the 
magistrate make the recording, not the officer. I have a 
copy of the rule right here in front of me. 
THE COURT: So in other words if he had faxed a copy 
of this to him or e-mailed it to him? 
MR. GRAVIS: That might be good enough so the 
magistrate could file that at the time of the issuance of the 
warrant or have a copy, but he didn't. There's nothing here 
that Judge West retained a copy of any conversation, or even 
a copy of the warrant, which the rule specifically requires. 
THE COURT: Do you want to respond? 
MR. SHAW: Yeah. I think 40 (i) and 40(1) are 
mutually exclusive given the change in the law and statute. 
10 
40(1) was designed for this very purpose of obtaining remote 
warrants and not require the kind of thing that Mr. Gravis is 
suggesting we have to do. 
The important part is was Officer Turley sworn under oath 
and did he testify accurately as part of that oath and 
affirmation to obtain the warrant? I don't read 40 (i) — I 
don't have a copy with me, but I don't read 40 (i) as negating 
the content of 40(1), which is very specific about remote 
warrants. 
MR. GRAVIS: I submit — 
THE COURT: I'm going to take it under advisement. 
MR. GRAVIS: Okay. 
THE COURT: I'll get you a decision when I get it 
made. In the meantime, I guess we'll leave the trial date 
set where it's at. I assume the state will proceed on trial 
anyway, regardless of the warrant, or the affidavit or the 
test results, the blood sample? 
MR. SHAW: Yeah. It may change our prospects for 
negotiations, though, Your Honor. It Could negate the trial 
date. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll do my best to get a 
decision out to you. I have other things on the table also. 
MR. GRAVIS: We have a pretrial scheduled in two 
weeks. 
THE COURT: I should have it by then. 
11 
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see what happens. I 
Does it show a nonjury trial setting? 
No, a jury setting. All right. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
Thank 
Your Honor, I received a telephone call 
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THE COURT: State of Utah versus William Dominguez, 
071901654. 
MR. GRAVIS: This is set for pretrial, but it's 
first on for a decision — 
THE COURT: Yes, a decision on the motion to 
suppress. After reviewing the rule again and after reviewing 
my notes on this, it would appear that there's a technical 
violation of the rule, of the new rule. Part of the problem 
with that rule is that it provides for a telephonic search 
warrant, which was done, authorized by Judge West. But if 
you refer back to the previous part of the rule it requires 
that the magistrate simultaneously is supposed to seal the 
search warrant and the affidavit. Well, that's somewhat 
difficult to do when you have a telephonic search warrant, 
unless you actually physically tape record it, which we don't 
have the facility to do that. 
So although there's a technical glitch, and I realize it 
was never filed either and that's another part of the 
problem, but I don't believe, given my review of the case 
law, that that invalidates the warrant. I'm not sure what 
the remedy is, but I don't think it invalidates the warrant. 
MR. GRAVIS: Okay, Your Honor, then we need to pass 
this case. I think we're going to resolve it anyway today, 
but I need some time to talk with Mr. Shaw. 
THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. We had to strike 
2 
the trial date anyway because of a witness unavailability, I 
think. Go ahead and talk and we'll pas^ it for now. So the 
motion is denied. 
(Other cases heard.) 
MR. GRAVIS: If we can recall number 14, William 
Dominguez. 
THE COURT: State versus William Dominguez. 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, as I indicated before, we 
had a resolution, I just needed to clarify a couple of 
things. He's going to plead guilty to a third degree felony, 
DUI, and no insurance. The state will dismiss the remaining 
charges. Furthermore, they agree he may reserve his right to 
appeal the court's decision on the motipn to suppress. 
MR. SHAW: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. For the recqrd on my decision 
again, so it's clear in case there is an appeal. Although, 
as I said, there may have been a technical violation in that 
the search warrant and affidavit were not delivered to the 
courthouse sealed, the rule also contemplates something 
that's virtually impossible to do when you have a telephonic 
search warrant and that's to simultaneously have the 
magistrate seal it. There would be no reason to do it over 
the phone if that was the case. I think that's a problem 
that needs to be straightened out by the rule. 
As I said, I recognize the search warrant and affidavit 
3 
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THE COURT: Okay. I'm sure I brought the file 
but now we can't seem to find it. I 
to attend a meeting. We can either p 
moment or come back to it next week. 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
Tuesday 
1 anyway. 
THE COURT: We'll do it next Tuesday 
at two o'clock. This was a date for 
I'll strike the trial date, assuming 
I be entering pleas. 
1 matters 
MR. GRAVIS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
I have. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
1 (Hearing concluded.) 
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